Substantive editing sample 59:
Social insurance in India

The author of this academic manuscript on economics disclosed that he was "looking for somebody who can make the text smoother to read." He acknowledged that the prose needed "to become more engaging…to be more exciting and intriguing"—essentially to be more vivid. My suggested revisions dealt with muddy verbiage encumbered with redundancy, lack of precision, and ambiguous or questionable word choice, including occasional clichés. There were also problems with confusing syntax, lack of coherence, and inconsistent style choices.

Note: The author of this piece was not a native English speaker. He very much appreciated the heavy commentary that explained my thinking behind the many suggested revisions. The highlighted comments elucidated for him many of the subtle peculiarities of American English.

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Original
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Can public interventions persistently reduce conflict? This question is more important than ever. The last decades have seen dramatic episodes of social unrest, some of which turned violent, leading to civil war and state failure. This has affected the lives of millions of people. Between 1946-2005 it is estimated that civil wars claimed 10.1 million lives and currently, more than one third of developing countries are affected by internal conflict.1 In an effort to contain spreading conflicts, billions of dollars are spent on military interventions. This often takes the form of providing arms and training for different fighting groups. The open question is, whether such money could have been spent to prevent conflict in the first place. The academic literature can help guide policy making, as it has put a lot of emphasis on identifying drivers of conflict. Two interlinked empirical regularities stand out. Low incomes provide a breeding ground for civil conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2004; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006) and adverse shocks to incomes induce new conflicts to break out or lead to an intensification of existing ones (Bazzi and Blattman, 2014; Dube and Vargas, 2013; Besley and Persson, 2008; Miguel et al., 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). This robust empirical relationship provides a blue print for a policy: social insurance. Any public intervention that helps households to smooth income following adverse shocks has the potential to break the link between income shocks and conflict. The scope for public interventions to protect households from income risks is huge in developing countries. The 35 poorest countries with real GDP per capita less than USD 1000 have experienced 2.8 times more volatile growth in consumption per capita compared to the 35 richest countries.2 Yet, the share of public resources devoted to social insurance in developing countries is dismal. Data from the International Labor Organization for the same set of countries suggests that the share of GDP devoted to social protection for the poorest countries with real GDP per capita less than USD 1000 lies at 4.4 % compared to an average of 20.5 % for the set of richest countries.3 The recent World Development Report 2014 arrives at similar figures. The development of social safety nets is one central policy recommendation of that report. Given the strong link between adverse income shocks and conflict, an effective social insurance could have profound effects on conflict: it could break the link between income shocks and conflict. This paper provides evidence that social insurance can achieve just that. The challenge for researchers is to find a context in which the interplay between social insurance and conflict can be studied. First, it is difficult to find a developing country context in which an effective social insurance has been introduced. This is not aided by the fact that developing countries spend little public resources on social protection despite the pronounced consumption risk. Even if a country spends significant resources on social protection it is not clear, whether this truly reflects social insurance. The latter being defined as, providing a state-contingent payout to individuals that are adversely affected by shocks. Given a set of policies that developing countries classify as social protection, this needs to be refined to only include policies that have the potential to function as insurance. Last but not least, if such a policy has been identified in a country, it is important to bear in mind that delivery of social insurance may be particularly difficult in countries that already experience conflict. India checks all three boxes providing a unique testing ground to study the relationship between social insurance and conflict. First, the country has suffered from many low-intensity intra-state conflicts throughout its history. These conflicts are endemic but have a relatively low intensity so that the state still functions on many dimensions. Secondly, India has put forth many development schemes. Most recently from 2006 onwards, India has introduced a public employment program through the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). This program has the potential to function as social insurance by providing public employment on local infrastructure projects at minimum wages when households demand it. Third, NREGA is a large program and due to its scale may have an impact on the dynamics of conflict. It is the biggest public employment scheme in mankind’s history, currently reaching up to 47.9 million rural households annually, generating 210 million person-days of employment. On a typical day, 7.7 million workers are expected to show up to work on one of nearly 294 thousand work sites.4

Markup
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Can public interventions [(1) "public" implies a "democratic" state, where the "public" at large is represented, whereas interventions to reduce social conflict can be from autocratic governments (even those with the word "People's" as part of their name)--right?...--so I recommend "government interventions" (or "state interventions"), but since you use "public" throughout your paper, we can discuss this change. (2) To contrast these government interventions from the "military interventions" you bring up a few sentences from here, you need to specify what these interventions are for: to protect a population from devastating loss, which is the main topic of your paper] persistently [I recommend deleting the preceding word--its current position implies that whatever reduction of conflict results from the interventions would be persistent (continuous and ongoing), but perhaps you might mean that the conflict the government intends to reduce is itself persistent (continuous and ongoing)... in either case, I think the word persistently is unnecessary... your question is about whether state interventions can reduce conflict, whether the conflict is persistent or not, whether the reduction effort is persistent or not... any persistence in the reduction effort or in the conflict itself is beside the point (and rather muddies the question). If conflicts are really reduced, there is an implied persistence in the reduction (any temporary reduction would not really count as a true reduction)] reduce conflict? [let's be more specific about what kind of conflict: social conflict] Can government interventions to protect a population from devastating loss reduce social conflict? This question is more important than ever. The last decades have seen [let's join your statement that the question is more important now (compared with "ever") with the reason why it is more important] question has acquired increased importance in the past few decades, which have seen dramatic episodes of social unrest, some of which turned violent, leading to civil war and state failure. This [the referent for "This" is civil war and state failure, but it is vague] has affected the failure, affecting the lives of millions of people. Between 1946-2005 [style guidelines stipulate "and" rather than dash in a range preceded by "between"] it is estimated that civil Between 1946 and 2005, civil wars claimed 10.1 million lives and currently, more claimed an estimated 10.1 million lives, and more than one third than a third ["a third" rather than "one third" is a more natural way to express a portion that is not precise] of developing countries are affected by are currently impacted [this is a stronger word denoting the effect of conflict] by internal conflict.1 In an effort to contain spreading conflicts, [(1) "To" is more concise than the wordy (deadwood) "In an effort to"; (2) we aid coherence by tying your sentences together: The word "such" before "conflicts" in this sentence can tie those conflicts to the "internal conflict" of the preceding sentence] billions To contain such conflicts from spreading, governments spend billions of dollars are spent on [active rather than passive voice (when the acting agent is known) usually makes for more vivid prose] dollars on military interventions. This often takes the form of providing [again, there are a lot of extra words here] interventions, typically providing arms and training for different fighting groups. The open question is, [let's make the "open question" an actual question] whether such money could have been spent groups. Might not this money have been better spent to prevent conflict in the first place. the first place? The academic literature can help guide policy making, as it has put a lot of emphasis on identifying drivers [(1) passive rather than active voice is sometimes preferable (in spite of all the how-to-write guides that condemn the passive voice) when it aids coherence (tying successive sentences together); you ended the preceding paragraph on government policy choices, which is now the given information for this new paragraph. The given information should come first, before the introduced new information about the academic literature that can help policy making... Putting policy making before the literature necessitates passive voice... (2) you need "the" before "drivers"] Government policy choices can be guided by the academic literature, which has put great emphasis on identifying the drivers of conflict of social conflict. Two interlinked empirical regularities stand out. Low out: Low incomes provide a breeding ground for civil conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2004; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006) and 2006), and adverse shocks to incomes induce new conflicts to break out or lead to an intensification of existing or intensify existing ones (Bazzi and Blattman, 2014; Dube and Vargas, 2013; Besley and Persson, 2008; Miguel et al., 2004; Fearon and Laitin, 2003). [The APA Publication Manual stipulates alphabetical order for a group of in-text citations, and I have revised to that stipulation] ones (Bazzi and Blattman, 2014; Besley and Persson, 2008; Dube and Vargas, 2013; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Miguel et al., 2004). This robust empirical relationship provides a blue print for a blueprint for a policy: social insurance. Any public intervention Any government intervention that helps households to smooth income households maintain their income following adverse shocks has the potential to break shocks can break the link between income shocks and conflict. The scope for public interventions for government interventions to protect households from income risks is huge in developing countries. The 35 poorest countries with real GDP per capita less real per-capita GDP less than USD 1000 have experienced 2.8 times more volatile growth in consumption per capita compared to the ["compared to" is for poetry; numerical comparisons need "with"] growth in per-capita consumption compared with the 35 richest countries.2 Yet, the share of public resources of government resources devoted to social insurance in developing countries is dismal. Data is meager. Data from the International Labor Organization for the same set of countries suggests that the share of GDP devoted to social protection for the protection in the poorest countries with real GDP per capita less poorest countries, those with real per-capita GDP less than USD 1000 lies at 4.4 % compared to an 1000, averages 4.4%, compared with an average of 20.5 % for of 20.5% for the set of richest countries.3 [are these the same "35 poorest countries" you referred to earlier?] The recent World ["recent" is redundant with "2014"] The World Development Report 2014 arrives at similar figures. The development of social of a social safety nets is one central safety net is a central policy recommendation of that report. [Singular, when applicable, is easier for a reader to visualize than plural (the report recommends that each government develop a safety net).] Given the strong link between adverse income shocks and conflict, an effective social insurance could have profound effects on conflict: it could break [I revised to eliminate redundancy] could break the link between income shocks and conflict. This paper provides evidence that social insurance can achieve just that. The challenge for researchers is to find a context in which the interplay Finding a context where the interplay between social insurance and conflict can be studied. [in this paragraph you are providing "three boxes" (criteria) that India will satisfy in the next paragraph... To make your argument easiest to follow between the two paragraphs (and throughout the paper) let's identify the criteria in this paragraph with ordinal numbers (First, Second, and Third) and make each criterion a question that must be addressed. That is what I have worked to achieve with my revision of this paragraph (I also cut out extraneous words that tend to bog a reader down).] First, it is difficult to find a developing studied is a challenge for researchers. First, which developing country context in which an country has introduced an effective social insurance has been introduced. This is not aided by the fact that developing countries insurance program? Developing countries spend little public resources on social protection despite the pronounced consumption risk. Even if risk. Second, even if a country spends significant resources on social protection it is not clear, whether this truly reflects social protection, does that social protection really count as social insurance. The latter being defined as, providing a insurance—that is, does it provide a state-contingent payout to individuals that are adversely affected by individuals who have been adversely impacted by shocks. Given a set of policies shocks? Any given set of policies that developing countries classify as social protection, this needs to be countries have classified as “social protection” must be refined to only include policies ["only" should be close to the word or phrase it restricts--in this case "policies" rather than "include"] refined to include only those policies that have the potential to function that can function as insurance. Last but not least, ["Last but not least" is a cliché... anyway, we should have each of the three questions introduced by an ordinal number: "First," "Second," and "Third"] if such a policy has been identified in a country, [the preceding "if" clause is redundant with ground already covered] it is important to bear in mind [you want your reader to realize that all of your paper (every bit of it) is "important to bear in mind"--so those words are extraneous verbiage] that delivery of social insurance may be particularly difficult in countries that already experience conflict. [Let's make this question a real question, like the two others] insurance. Third, can the social insurance be delivered if the country is already experiencing conflict? India checks all three boxes providing a [it doesn't provide the testing ground; it is the testing ground] India satisfies all three criteria for being a unique testing ground to study the ground for studying the relationship between social insurance and conflict. [The following revision is to match each criterion with the corresponding criterion (question) in the previous paragraph, and to maintain the same order: 1. which country has an effective social insurance program? 2. Does the "social protection" count as "insurance"? 3. Can the insurance be delivered even in the midst of conflict? (Therefore, I changed your "Secondly" to "First" and moved other text around throughout the paragraph.)] First, the country has suffered from many low-intensity intra-state conflicts throughout its history. These conflicts are endemic but have a relatively low intensity so that the state still functions on many dimensions. Secondly, India has put forth many development schemes. First, the country has instituted many development schemes. Most recently from schemes, but most recently, from 2006 onwards, India has 2006 onward, it has introduced a public employment program through the National the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). [in your section under the heading "2 - Context: Conflict and Insurance in India," you again introduce this act, but there you include "Mahatma Gandhi" as part of the name of the act. Of course, you should keep the act's name consistent throughout the manuscript] This program has the potential to function Second, this program can function as social insurance by providing public employment on local infrastructure projects at minimum wages when households demand it. Third, NREGA is a large program and due to its scale may have an impact on the dynamics Third, though India has suffered throughout its history from many endemic intrastate conflicts, the low intensity of those conflicts enables the state to function on many dimensions. The large scale of NREGA, the largest public employment scheme in human history, can impact the dynamics of conflict. It is the biggest public employment scheme in mankind’s history, currently reaching up to 47.9 million It currently reaches 47.9 million rural households annually, generating 210 million person-days of employment. On a typical day, 7.7 million workers are expected to show up to work on one of nearly 294 thousand work sites nearly 294,000 worksites.4

Result
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Can government interventions to protect a population from devastating loss reduce social conflict? This question has acquired increased importance in the past few decades, which have seen dramatic episodes of social unrest, some of which turned violent, leading to civil war and state failure, affecting the lives of millions of people. Between 1946 and 2005, civil wars claimed an estimated 10.1 million lives, and more than a third of developing countries are currently impacted by internal conflict.1 To contain such conflicts from spreading, governments spend billions of dollars on military interventions, typically providing arms and training for different fighting groups. Might not this money have been better spent to prevent conflict in the first place? Government policy choices can be guided by the academic literature, which has put great emphasis on identifying the drivers of social conflict. Two interlinked empirical regularities stand out: Low incomes provide a breeding ground for civil conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, 2004; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006), and adverse shocks to incomes induce new conflicts to break out or intensify existing ones (Bazzi and Blattman, 2014; Besley and Persson, 2008; Dube and Vargas, 2013; Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Miguel et al., 2004). This robust empirical relationship provides a blueprint for a policy: social insurance. Any government intervention that helps households maintain their income following adverse shocks can break the link between income shocks and conflict. The scope for government interventions to protect households from income risks is huge in developing countries. The 35 poorest countries with real per-capita GDP less than USD 1000 have experienced 2.8 times more volatile growth in per-capita consumption compared with the 35 richest countries.2 Yet, the share of government resources devoted to social insurance in developing countries is meager. Data from the International Labor Organization for the same set of countries suggests that the share of GDP devoted to social protection in the poorest countries, those with real per-capita GDP less than USD 1000, averages 4.4%, compared with an average of 20.5% for the set of richest countries.3 The World Development Report 2014 arrives at similar figures. The development of a social safety net is a central policy recommendation of that report. Given the strong link between adverse income shocks and conflict, an effective social insurance could break the link between income shocks and conflict. This paper provides evidence that social insurance can achieve just that. Finding a context where the interplay between social insurance and conflict can be studied is a challenge for researchers. First, which developing country has introduced an effective social insurance program? Developing countries spend little public resources on social protection despite the pronounced consumption risk. Second, even if a country spends significant resources on social protection, does that social protection really count as social insurance—that is, does it provide a state-contingent payout to individuals who have been adversely impacted by shocks? Any given set of policies that developing countries have classified as “social protection” must be refined to include only those policies that can function as insurance. Third, can the social insurance be delivered if the country is already experiencing conflict? India satisfies all three criteria for being a unique testing ground for studying the relationship between social insurance and conflict. First, the country has instituted many development schemes, but most recently, from 2006 onward, it has introduced a public employment program through the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA). Second, this program can function as social insurance by providing public employment on local infrastructure projects at minimum wages when households demand it. Third, though India has suffered throughout its history from many endemic intrastate conflicts, the low intensity of those conflicts enables the state to function on many dimensions. The large scale of NREGA, the largest public employment scheme in human history, can impact the dynamics of conflict. It currently reaches 47.9 million rural households annually, generating 210 million person-days of employment. On a typical day, 7.7 million workers are expected to show up to work on one of nearly 294,000 worksites.4